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Abstract
Recently, some researchers [9, 1, 2] introduced the notions of subjective constraint
monotonicity, epistemic splitting, and foundedness for epistemic logic programs, aim-
ing to use them as main criteria/intuitions to compare different answer set semantics
proposed in the literature on how they comply with these intuitions. In this note we
demonstrate that these three properties are too strong and may exclude some desired
answer sets/world views. Therefore, such properties should not be used as necessary
conditions for answer set semantics.
1 Introduction
Gelfond [6] introduced the notion of epistemic specifications which are disjunctive logic
programs extended with two epistemic modal operatorsK andM. Informally, for a formula
F and a collection A of interpretations, KF is true in A if F is true in every I ∈ A, and
MF is true in A if F is true in some I ∈ A. An epistemic specification/program Π consists
of rules of the form
L1 | · · · | Lm ← G1 ∧ · · · ∧Gn (1)
where each L is an object literal that is either an atom A or its strong negation ∼A, and
each G is an object literal, a default negated literal of the form ¬L, or a modal literal of
the form KL, ¬KL, ML or ¬ML. A rule (1) is called a constraint if its head is ⊥, and
called a subjective constraint if additionally each G is a modal literal. Π is a non-epistemic
program if it contains no modal literals.
Gelfond [6] defined the first answer set semantics for an epistemic program Π as follows.
Given a collection A of interpretations as an assumption, Π is transformed into a modal
reduct ΠA w.r.t. A by first removing all rules with a modal literal G that is not true in A,
then removing the remaining modal literals. The assumption A is defined to be a world
view of Π if it coincides with the collection of answer sets of ΠA under the GL-semantics
defined in [8].
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It turns out that the above semantics for epistemic programs has both the problem of
unintended world views with recursion through K and the problem due to recursion through
M [7, 11]. For the first problem, an illustrative example is Π = {p ← Kp}; under the above
semantics Π has two world views A1 = {∅} and A2 = {{p}}, where as commented in [7], A2
is undesired. For the second problem, a typical example is Π = {p ← Mp}; by the above
semantics Π has two world views A1 = {∅} and A2 = {{p}}, where as commented in [11],
A1 may be undesired.
To address the two problems, several approaches have been proposed [11, 10, 3, 16].
In particular, Shen and Eiter[16] presented an approach that significantly differs from the
others in the following aspects. (i) They introduced the modal operator not to directly
express epistemic negation, where notF expresses that there is no evidence proving that
F is true. Modal formulas KF and MF are viewed as shorthands for ¬notF and not¬F ,
respectively. (ii) Due to having the modal operator not to express epistemic negation, they
further proposed to apply epistemic negation to minimize the knowledge in world views,
a novel principle they named knowledge minimization with epistemic negation. It is based
on the principle of knowledge minimization with epistemic negation that they presented a
completely new definition of world views, which are free of both the problem with recursion
through K and the problem through M. (iii) Their approach is general and can be used to
extend any existing answer set semantics for non-epistemic programs, such as those defined
in [14, 15, 20, 4, 5, 18, 17], to one for epistemic programs.
Very recently, some researchers [9, 1, 2] introduced the notions of subjective constraint
monotonicity, epistemic splitting, and foundedness for epistemic programs, aiming to use
them as main criteria/intuitions to compare different answer set semantics proposed in
the literature on how they comply with these intuitions. Specifically, they criticized the
semantics defined in [11, 10, 3, 16], saying that these semantics do not satisfy the three
properties.
In this note, we clarify the matter by demonstrating that these three properties are too
strong and may exclude some desired answer sets/world views. Therefore, such properties
should not be used as necessary conditions for answer set semantics.
2 Subjective constraint monotonicity is too strong, while the
requirement of epistemic splitting is even more restrictive
A semantics is said to satisfy subjective constraint monotonicity if for any epistemic pro-
gram Π and subjective constraint C, a world view of Π ∪ {C} is also a world view of Π;
in other words, adding any constraint C to Π would never introduce new world views.
The epistemic splitting property is even more restrictive in the sense that every semantics
satisfying epistemic splitting also satisfies subjective constraint monotonicity [1].
As a typical example, let Π = {p | q}, which has a unique world view {{p}, {q}}. Then
subjective constraint monotonicity requires that for any subjective constraint C, Π ∪ {C}
should either have a unique world view {{p}, {q}} or have no world view. For example,
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under subjective constraint monotonicity the following program
Π1 : p | q r1
⊥ ← ¬Kp C
has no world view, as the only world view {{p}, {q}} of Π = {p | q} is not a model of
Π1. Note that under the semantics of [11, 10, 3, 16], Π1 has a world view A = {{p}}.
It is argued in [9, 1, 19] that {{p}} should not be a world view of Π1 because it violates
subjective constraint monotonicity.
We comment that the requirement of constraint monotonicity (resp. epistemic splitting),
i.e., adding constraints to a logic program should not introduce new answer sets/world
views, is too strong and may exclude some desired answer sets/world views, as demonstrated
in the following examples.
1. For a non-epistemic program Π, the GL-semantics [8] satisfies the constraint mono-
tonicity property that adding a constraint ⊥ ← body(r) to Π may rule out some
answer sets of Π, but would never introduce new answer sets [13]. However, very
recent research [17] reveals that the GL-semantics may miss some desired answer sets
that violate constraint monotonicity (see Section 4.1 in [17]). As an example, consider
the following non-epistemic program
Π2 : a | b r1
a ← b r2
⊥ ← ¬b C
where C is a constraint. Intuitively, the rule r1 presents two alternatives for answer
set construction, namely a or b, and the rule r2 infers a if b has already been derived.
We distinguish between the following two cases.
First, suppose that we choose a from r1. As b is not inferred from r1, the rule r2
is not applicable; so rules r1 and r2 together infer a possible answer set I1 = {a}. As
I1 does not satisfy the constraint C, it is not a candidate answer set for Π2.
Alternatively, suppose that we choose b from r1; then by r2 we obtain a possible
answer set I2 = {a, b}. I2 satisfies the constraint C, so it is a candidate answer set
for Π2.
As I2 = {a, b} is the only model of Π2, it is the only candidate answer set and
thus we expect I2 to be an answer set of Π2. However, as Π2 \ {C} has only one
answer set {a}, this desired answer set I2 for Π2 violates the constraint monotonicity
property.
2. For epistemic programs, the requirement of subjective constraint monotonicity (resp.
epistemic splitting) may also exclude some world views that are reasonably acceptable.
As an example, consider the above program Π1 again. As the rule r1 = p | q offers
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two alternatives for answer set construction, namely p or q, we can generate from r1
two possible answer sets: {p} and {q}. Then we can construct from the two possible
answer sets three possible world views: A1 = {{p}}, A2 = {{q}} and A3 = {{p}, {q}}.
As A2 and A3 do not satisfy the constraint ⊥ ← ¬Kp, A1 is the only candidate world
view and thus we expect it to be a world view of Π1. However, this desired world
view will be excluded if we enforce subjective constraint monotonicity.
3. The above defined constraint monotonicity, which requires world views of Π ∪ {C}
to be world views of Π satisfying C, amounts in essence to interpreting constraint
C as a query. Let S be the collection of world views of Π. A query C to Π is to
find in S all world views that satisfy C. Note that query C is not involved in the
computation of any world view. This essentially differs from adding a constraint C to
Π, which aims to computing the collection of world views of Π ∪ {C}; due to that C
is directly involved in the computation of every world view, a world view of Π ∪ {C}
is not necessarily a world view of Π.
3 The foundedness requirement is too strong to characterize
self-supported-free answer sets/world views
The foundedness property is defined in [2], which extends the notion of foundedness in-
troduced in [12] from non-epistemic programs to epistemic programs. The GL-semantics
[8] for non-epistemic programs also has the foundedness property. We use examples to
demonstrate that the foundedness requirement is too strong and may exclude some desired
answer sets/world views. For simplicity, we do not reproduce the definition of foundedness
here; the reader is referred to [2].
1. Consider again the above non-epistemic program Π2, which has only one model I =
{a, b}. Note that b is established (and also well-supported) in r1. Then once b is
selected from r1, a is well-supported in r2. By well-supported we mean self-supported
free. Therefore, I is well-supported in r1 and r2. As I satisfies the constraint C, it is
the only candidate answer set for Π2 and thus is a desired answer set of Π2. However,
this desired answer set, though being self-supported free, violates the foundedness
property. (It is easy to check that 〈{b}, I〉 is an unfounded set.) This example shows
that the foundedness property cannot characterize self-supported-free answer sets.
2. Consider the following epistemic program:
Π3 : p | q r1
p ← Kq r2
q ← Kp r3
⊥ ← ¬Kp C
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As p | q offers two alternatives for answer set construction, namely p or q, we can
generate from r1 two possible answer sets: {p, · · · } and {q, · · · }, where “· · · ” stands for
possible atoms that would be derived from the rules r2 and r3. Then we can construct
from the two possible answer sets three possible world views: A1 = {{p, · · · }}, A2 =
{{q, · · · }}, and A3 = {{p, · · · }, {q, · · · }} = {{p}, {q}}. Note that the two answer sets
in A3 must be different and no one is a proper subset of the other. We distinguish
among the following three cases.
First, suppose that we choose A1 = {{p, · · · }}. Note that p in A1 is established
in r1. Then, as A1 satisfies Kp, q is well-supported in r3 and thus A1 = {{p, q}}. A1
also satisfies r2 and C, so it is a candidate world view for Π3.
Second, suppose that we choose A2 = {{q, · · · }}. Note that q in A2 is established
in r1. Then, as A2 satisfies Kq, p is well-supported in r2 and thus A2 = {{p, q}}. A2
satisfies r3 and C, so it is further shown that {{p, q}} is a candidate world view for
Π3.
Finally, suppose that we choose A3 = {{p}, {q}}. A3 does not satisfy C, so it is
not a candidate world view for Π3.
Consequently, {{p, q}} is the only candidate world view for Π3, so we expect it to
be a world view of Π3. However, this desired world view, though being self-supported
free, violates the foundedness property. (It is easy to check that [〈{p}, {p, q}〉, 〈{q}, {p, q}〉]
is an unfounded set.) This example shows that the foundedness property cannot char-
acterize self-supported-free world views.
4 Conclusions
The above examples demonstrate that the properties of subjective constraint monotonicity,
epistemic splitting and foundedness are too strong and may exclude some desired answer
sets/world views. It was specifically emphasized in [7, 11, 16] that the focus of research on
answer set semantics for epistemic programs is how to handle the two basic problems:
1. The problem of unintended world views caused by recursion through K;
2. The problem of unintended world views caused due to recursion through M.
In fact, by introducing the epistemic negation operator not and applying the principle
of knowledge minimization with epistemic negation, Shen and Eiter [16] has presented a
principled way to handle the two problems. For example, the desired answer sets/world
views of the above programs Π1−Π3 can all be obtained by applying the general semantics
defined in Definition 8 of [16], where the base answer set semantics X for a non-epistemic
program is that defined in Definition 10 of [17].
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